Ejerskabsstrukturer Og Kontrol-Allokering I Unoterede Danske Virksomheder
AbstractWe analyse the relationship between the distribution of ownership and the allocation of control in Danish closely held corporations. First, we investigate why firms have boards. Second, we identify relationships between owners, boardmembers and CEOs in these firms. Third, we show the presence of control dilution in firms with multiple owners. Finally, we discuss some implications for Danish corporate law of our findings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 04-2001.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 15 May 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Allocation of control; Denmark; closely held corporations; boardmembers; Corporate Law; Corporate governance;
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- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
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