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Delegated Portfolio Management with Socially Responsible Investment Constraints


Author Info

  • Fabretti, Annalisa

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata")

  • Herzel, Stefano

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata")


We consider the problem of how to set a compensation for a portfolio manager who is required to restrict the investment set, as it happens when applying socially responsible screening. This is a problem of Delegated Portfolio Management where the reduction of the investment opportunities to the subset of sustainable assets involves a loss in the expected earnings for the portfolio manager, compensated by the investor through an extra bonus on the realized return. Under simple assumptions on the investor, the manager and the market, we compute the optimal bonus as a function of the manager's risk aversion and his expertise, and of the impact of the portfolio restriction on the Mean Variance efficient frontier. We conclude by discussing the problem of selecting the best managers when his ability is not directly observable by the investor.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Sustainable Investment Research Platform in its series Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers with number 2010/7.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhb:sicgwp:2010_007

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Postal: Economics of Corporate Sustainability Management, Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44 Stockholm, SWEDEN
Phone: 08-790 78 61
Fax: 08-790 76 17
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Keywords: Delegated portfolio management; Socially responsible investment; Incentives; Extrinsic incentives; Intrinsic motives;

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Cited by:
  1. Sheng, Jiliang & Wang, Xiaoting & Yang, Jun, 2012. "Incentive contracts in delegated portfolio management under VaR constraint," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1679-1685.
  2. Annalisa Fabretti & Stefano Herzel & Mustafa C. Pinar, 2014. "Delegated Portfolio Management under Ambiguity Aversion," CEIS Research Paper 304, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 06 Feb 2014.


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