On Incentives for Sustainable Investments
AbstractThere is a trend among institutional investors to split their assets between index-managers and specialists. The specialist mandates are typically delegated to specialist asset managers, who are assumed to generate "alpha", take on large risks and whose remuneration is performance based. In this paper, we will study how the optimal behavior of the specialist manager will depend on the remuneration structure.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sustainable Investment Research Platform in its series Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers with number 2010/1.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 19 Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics of Corporate Sustainability Management, Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44 Stockholm, SWEDEN
Phone: 08-790 78 61
Fax: 08-790 76 17
Web page: http://www.sirps.se
More information through EDIRC
Incentives; portfolio choice; sustainable investments; value function;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-13 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Pontus Cerin).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.