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Incitamentsreglering av monopol med styckvis linjär approximation av efterfrågan

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Author Info
Lantz, Björn () (Department of Business Administration, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)
Abstract

One anonymous mechanism for monopoly regulation is the Chord-approximation Adjustment Process, CAP, suggested by Vogelsang (1988) where the change in consumer surplus is approximated as an average between a Laspeyres and a Paasche index. The main drawback of this method is an incentive for strategic pricing behaviour so that the price will not converge to marginal cost whenever demand is not linear. This paper shows how the change in consumer surplus under a non-linear demand curve can be approximated piecewise linearly based on solely verifiable information which removes the incentive for strategic behaviour.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2607
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Göteborg University, Department of Business Administration in its series FE rapport with number 2005-407.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 29 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhb:gunwba:2005_407

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Dept of Business Adminstration, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Box 610, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/fek/
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Related research
Keywords: Monopoly regulation; incentive regulation;

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