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Campaign Finance and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States

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Author Info
David M. Primo
Jeffrey D. Milyo

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Abstract

The decline of political efficacy and political trust in the United States is often linked to the rise of money in politics. Both the courts and reform advocates justify restrictions on campaign donations and spending as necessary to restore faith in government. We conduct the first scientific test of whether campaign finance laws actually influence how citizens view their government by exploiting the variation in campaign finance regulations both across and within states over the last 50 years. Our analysis reveals no substantively large positive effects of campaign finance laws, although public disclosure laws and limits on contributions from organizations are associated with increased efficacy. However, public financing is associated with a decrease in efficacy. Consequently, we find little support for the frequent claim that stricter campaign finance regulations will restore Americans’ faith in government.

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File URL: http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp_03_15.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago in its series Working Papers with number 0315.

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Date of creation: Nov 2003
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Handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:0315

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Related research
Keywords: campaign finance; efficacy; public trust; money;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Stephen D. Levitt, 1998. "Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 19-35, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  4. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.


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