This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Cognitive Rules and Institutions - On the Interrelation of Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Rules

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Budzinski, Oliver

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Rules possess an important influence on rational individual behaviour. In economic analyses, two different types of rules occur that both induce rule-following behaviour, however, they are rarely distinguished. The differentiation of interpersonal rules (institutions as collective rules) and intrapersonal rules (cognitive rules and models as individual rules) allows for a clarification of substantial differences of the two types of rules, for example, concerning the incorporated knowledge and rule-persistence. Above all, the analysis of the interrelation of the two types of rules offers fruitful theoretical and political insights that still are not explored much in economics. The important dimensions to be considered are rule-harmony that stabilizes institutional arrangements and rule-conflict that induces pressure to persistent institutions. In this context, competition can be seen as a medium of interaction that allows individual agents to learn both about the behaviour of interacting agents and the nature and effects of the institutional framework. Applications of the generated insights include the driving forces and obstacles of institutional reform. Along with other influential factors, institutional reforms are inhibited if harmony between the old institutional arrangement and the prevailing cognitive theories and rules dominates, and encouraged if rule-conflict prevails. Thus, institutional policy has to consider the interrelation of intrapersonal and interpersonal rules to achieve its targets with a suitable probability. Further research probably will allow to derive general principles to institutional policy that facilitate successful institutional reforms.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover with number dp-241.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-241

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Koenigsworther Platz 1, D-30167 Hannover
Phone: (0511) 762-5350
Fax: (0511) 762-5665
Web page: http://www.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Dietrich, Karl).

Related research
Keywords: institutions; cognitive rules; rational individual behaviour; competition;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.