Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games
AbstractThis paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified. This means that full participation is required to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for a large variety of extensive modifications of the simultaneous-move participation game in the same vein as Kalai [Large Robust Games, Econometrica 72 (2004) 1631-1665].
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00586068.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
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mechanism design ; robust implementation ; strong Nash equilibrium ; partial subgame perfection ; collusion on participation;
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