Length Of Gp Consultation Within Two Payment Schemes
AbstractThis article presents an adaptation of the labour supply model applied to the independent medical in which doctor's choice of the length of consultations is examined. A theoretical analysis is performed in an attempt to define the sets of constraints to which self-employed doctors are subject, and they show a marked difference in time-allocation behaviour according to whether medical care is provided under a fixed-fee scheme or under an unregulated-fees scheme, respectively “sector 1” and “sector 2” in France. The objective of this econometric study was to analyse time-allocation choices made by doctors in both sectors in France and to validate the theoretical prediction that doctors under unregulated-fees can make choices about the length of patient consultations independently of their personal leisure choices. According to our empirical results, doctors with unregulated-fees indeed show different behaviours regarding leisure-consumption choices and consultation length. The endogeneity of leisure choice to consultation length –verified in fixed-fee scheme- is no longer apparent under unregulated-fee. Our findings can be seen as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for legitimate unregulated fees in general practice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00347449.
Date of creation: 15 Dec 2008
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leisure trade-off; Working time ; Consultation duration ; payment schemes ; General practitioners ; Simultaneous equations;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-03 (All new papers)
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- Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2013.
"Competition, prices, and quality in the market for physician consultations,"
089cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
- Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2013. "Competition, Prices and Quality in the Market for Physician Consultations," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2013n23, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
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