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Length Of Gp Consultation Within Two Payment Schemes

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Author Info

  • Olivier L'Haridon

    (GRID - Groupe de Recherche sur le risque, l'Information et la Décision - CNRS : UMR8534 - École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan)

  • Alain Panaponaris

    (Epidémiologie et Sciences Sociales Appliquées à l'Innovation Médicale - INSERM : U379 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II)

  • Camelia Protopopescu

    (Epidémiologie et Sciences Sociales Appliquées à l'Innovation Médicale - INSERM : U379 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II, Observatoire Régional de la Santé de Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur - ORS PACA)

  • Bruno Ventelou

    ()
    (Epidémiologie et Sciences Sociales Appliquées à l'Innovation Médicale - INSERM : U379 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II, GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

Abstract

This article presents an adaptation of the labour supply model applied to the independent medical in which doctor's choice of the length of consultations is examined. A theoretical analysis is performed in an attempt to define the sets of constraints to which self-employed doctors are subject, and they show a marked difference in time-allocation behaviour according to whether medical care is provided under a fixed-fee scheme or under an unregulated-fees scheme, respectively “sector 1” and “sector 2” in France. The objective of this econometric study was to analyse time-allocation choices made by doctors in both sectors in France and to validate the theoretical prediction that doctors under unregulated-fees can make choices about the length of patient consultations independently of their personal leisure choices. According to our empirical results, doctors with unregulated-fees indeed show different behaviours regarding leisure-consumption choices and consultation length. The endogeneity of leisure choice to consultation length –verified in fixed-fee scheme- is no longer apparent under unregulated-fee. Our findings can be seen as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for legitimate unregulated fees in general practice.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00347449.

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Date of creation: 15 Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00347449

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00347449/en/
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Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: leisure trade-off; Working time ; Consultation duration ; payment schemes ; General practitioners ; Simultaneous equations;

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Cited by:
  1. Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2013. "Competition, Prices and Quality in the Market for Physician Consultations," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2013n23, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.

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