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Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Béal

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Eric Rémila

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe Solal

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

A coalitional ranking describes a situation where a finite set of agents can form coalitions that are ranked according to a weak order. A social ranking solution on a domain of coalitional rankings assigns an individual ranking, that is a weak order over the agent set, to each coalitional ranking of this domain. We introduce two lexicographic solutions for a variable population domain of coalitional rankings. These solutions are computed from the individual performance of the agents, then, when this performance criterion does not allow to decide between two agents, a collective performance criterion is applied to the coalitions of higher size. We provide parallel axiomatic characterizations of these two solutions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2021. "Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances," Working Papers hal-04543824, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04543824
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-fcomte.hal.science/hal-04543824
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    Keywords

    Coalitional rankings -Converse consistency -Individual performance -Lexicographic criteria -Path monotonocity. JEL classification: C71;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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