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Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data (revised version)

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Author Info

  • Jean Pinquet

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Georges Dionne

    (HEC Montréal - HEC MONTRÉAL)

  • Mathieu Maurice

    (HEC Montréal)

  • Charles Vanasse

    (TD Asset Management)

Abstract

Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont, soit monétaires (amendes, primes d'assurance), soit non monétaires (permis à points). Nous analysons l'efficacité de ces mécanismes dans l'incitation à une conduite prudente. Nous déterminons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement dans un modèle qui sépare l'aléa moral de l'hétérogénéité inobservée. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions. Enfin, nous comparons l'efficacité globale de ces différents mécanismes incitatifs et nous calculons des équivalents monétaires pour les infractions et les suspensions de permis.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00331180.

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Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00331180

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Related research

Keywords: Mécanismes incitatifs; permis à points; sécurité routière;

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