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‘Much ado about nothing?’ Transnational civil society, consumer protection and financial regulatory reform

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  • Lisa Kastner

    (CEE - Centre d'études européennes et de politique comparée (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The literature on financial regulation has typically emphasized the role of the powerful financial industry in shaping regulatory outcomes. However, capture theories cannot explain the prominence of financial consumer protection in post-crisis reform agendas. By contrast, this article argues that, despite their collective action disadvantage, a polymorphous network of civil society organizations was able to gain momentum after the financial crisis and to influence the financial reform process. In this policy window, where decision-makers were looking out for an alternative source of expertise, a transnationally connected civil society (TCS) network successfully mobilized to place consumer protection on reform agendas in tandem with public entrepreneurs and on the back of a popular backlash against big finance. This argument will be explored through a comparative study of the impact of transnational pressures on policy-makers in Europe and the US in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. In the conclusion, the article shortly discusses the substance of the financial reforms that have been undertaken.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa Kastner, 2014. "‘Much ado about nothing?’ Transnational civil society, consumer protection and financial regulatory reform," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02186500, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-02186500
    DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2013.870084
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02186500
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521118590.
    2. Helleiner, Eric & Pagliari, Stefano, 2011. "The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 169-200, January.
    3. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521134132.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Kastner, 2017. "Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: The post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02186320, HAL.
    2. Lisa Kastner, 2017. "Business lobbying under salience," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02187871, HAL.
    3. Lisa Kastner, 2017. "From Outsiders to Insiders: A Civil Society Perspective on EU Financial Reforms," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-02184200, HAL.

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