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Que peut bien apporter l'analyse économique à l'application du droit de la concurrence ?

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Pénard

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • S. Souam

Abstract

The aim of this article is to convince that economic tools are useful and relevant to analyze antitrust policy. More precisely, we show that the economics of antitrust enforcement provides a helpful framework to address fundamental practical questions : How to efficiently enforce antitrust laws, under different constraints, like budget constraints or information asymmetry ? How to articulate ex ante and ex post monitoring? Which kind of mechanisms should antitrust authorities implement? This article presents and discusses the main models and results of this recent strand of the economic literature, focusing on price-fixing agreements and mergers. Classification JEL : K21, L41
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Pénard & S. Souam, 2002. "Que peut bien apporter l'analyse économique à l'application du droit de la concurrence ?," Post-Print halshs-00069679, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069679
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Bougette & Florent Venayre, 2008. "Contrôles a priori et a posteriori des concentrations : comment augmenter l'efficacité des politiques de concurrence," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 9-40.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    droit de la concurrence; analyse économique;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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