The impact of board characteristics and IPO’s quality on delisting risk: the French case

This paper examines the association between the probability of delisting for both economic and non-economic reasons and the i) corporate governance of IPO firms, ii) IPO quality, iii) post-IPO managerial ownership retention and iv) earnings management at the time of IPO. The sample consists of 168 IPO firms listed on the French stock exchange between 2000 and 2008. At a minimum of five years after the IPO time, the proportion of delisted firms is about 10.7% (delisting for economic reasons) and 24.4% (delisting for non-economic reasons). Finally, 64.9% of the IPO firms remain listed in 2013. Four main results are highlighted. First, the IPO quality is the most important driving factor of delisting (regardless of their reasons). Second, we find that the probability of delisting for economic reasons is negatively associated with the board size and the underwriter's reputation. In contrast, an aggressive earnings management at the time of IPO increases the risk of delisting for economic reasons. Third, we find that the probability of delisting for non-economic reasons decreases with the IPO quality as measured by the underwriter's reputation and the proportion of capital sold by managers. At last, pre-performance and age of IPO firms influence the likelihood to exit the market for both economic and non-economic reasons.