IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03969737.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers:The role of random priorities

Author

Listed:
  • Francis Bloch

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

This paper characterizes the second-best mechanism chosen by a benevolent planner under incentive compatibility constraints in queuing problems without monetary transfers. In the absence of monetary compensations, separation between types can only occur if jobs are processed with a probability strictly smaller than one for some configurations of the types. This entails a large efficiency cost, and the planner optimally chooses a pooling contract when types are drawn from a continuous distribution and when binary types are sufficiently close. In the binary model, a separating contract is optimal when the difference between high and low types is large, and results in a low probability of processing jobs when both agents announce high types.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch, 2017. "Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers:The role of random priorities," Post-Print hal-03969737, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03969737
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03969737. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.