IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03947632.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Positional effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Cabo

    (UVa - Universidad de Valladolid [Valladolid])

  • Alain Jean-Marie

    (NEO - Network Engineering and Operations - CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique)

  • Mabel Tidball

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier)

Abstract

Consumption satisfaction depends on other factors apart from the inherent characteristic of commodities. Among them, positional concerns are central in behavioral economics. Individuals enjoy returns from the ranking occupied by the consumed item. In public good, agents obtain satisfaction from their relative contribution. We analyze how positional preferences for voluntary contribution to a public good favor players' contributions and could lead to social welfare improvements. A two-player public good game is analyzed, first a one-shot game and later a simple dynamic game with inertia. Homogeneous and non-homogeneous individuals are considered and particular attention is given to the transition path.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Cabo & Alain Jean-Marie & Mabel Tidball, 2022. "Positional effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia," Post-Print hal-03947632, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03947632
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-03947632
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://inria.hal.science/hal-03947632/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03947632. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.