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Engaging In Wars Of Attrition

Author

Listed:
  • Maxime Menuet

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [2022-...] - UO - Université d'Orléans - UT - Université de Tours - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne)

  • Petros G Sekeris

Abstract

This article studies the incentives to engage in a war of attrition under both, complete and incomplete information. In our setup, a war of attrition can unilaterally be decided by any player, and if neither player engages in a war of attrition they each obtain some pre-determined payoff. Under complete information, we demonstrate that if players play pure-strategies, they engage in a war of attrition where one player will drop out immediately. In a mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium, no player engages in a war of attrition. Under incomplete information, players never engage in a war of attrition at the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium. When allowing players to decide to initiate a confrontation we therefore demonstrate that there can never be a war of attrition with a strictly positive drop out time along the equilibrium path.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maxime Menuet & Petros G Sekeris, 2022. "Engaging In Wars Of Attrition," Post-Print hal-03810175, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03810175
    DOI: 10.2307/48684787
    as

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    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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