IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03027487.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Contrôle et sanction des chômeurs en présence d'épargne de précaution

Author

Listed:
  • Sébastien Ménard

    (GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the consequences of monitoring and sanctions on the equilibrium unemployment rate when the workers can self-insure. We use a quantitative dynamic equilibrium search model with endogenous precautionary savings. When an unemployed worker declines a job or if the search intensity is insufficient, a sanction can be applied. The monitoring of search effort has a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment and the monitoring of refusals decreases the search intensity. We also show that poor unemployed workers are less sanctioned than others.

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien Ménard, 2019. "Contrôle et sanction des chômeurs en présence d'épargne de précaution," Post-Print hal-03027487, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03027487
    DOI: 10.7202/1076385ar
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03027487. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.