IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-02469871.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cross-sectoral pollution externalities and multiple equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Larry Karp

    (University of California, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics - UC Davis - University of California [Davis] - UC - University of California)

  • Thierry Paul

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In familiar models, a decrease in the friction facing mobile factors (e.g., lowering their adjustment costs) increases a coordination problem, leading to more circumstances where there are multiple equilibria. We show that a decrease in friction can decrease coordination problems when a production externality arises from a changing stock, e.g. of pollution or knowledge. In general, the relation between the amount of friction that mobile factors face and the likelihood of multiple equilibria is non-monotonic.

Suggested Citation

  • Larry Karp & Thierry Paul, 2019. "Cross-sectoral pollution externalities and multiple equilibria," Post-Print hal-02469871, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02469871
    DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X19000147
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-02469871
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://amu.hal.science/hal-02469871/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1017/S1355770X19000147?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antoci, Angelo & Iannucci, Gianluca & Rocchi, Benedetto & Ticci, Elisa, 2023. "The land allocation game: Externalities and evolutionary competition," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 124-133.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    costs of adjustment; multiple equilibria; factor reallocation; intersectoral migration; learning-by-doing; coordination games; cross-sectoral pollution;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02469871. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.