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La relation banque-entreprise : structures de gouvernement et formes de coordination

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  • Jean-Pierre Allegret

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bernard Baudry

    (CALW - Centre Auguste et Léon Walras - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

[eng] To analyse governance structures between banks and firms, the authors test the relevance of the concept of « quasi-integration » use in industrial economics to indicate an intermediate transaction between market and hierarchy. The criterion of information is here essential to study the relation between firms and banks. In a quasi-integration relationship, first information is shared and generates sunk costs, second the relation is a long term one, and last such a relation allow the firm to invest in innovative projects. Whereas in a market relationship, incentive is the principal form of coordination, in a hierarchy relationship, it is in fact authority. In the second part of the paper, we show that in a quasi-integration relationship, three forms of coordination are combined together : authority, incentive and trust. Because of this plurality, such governance structure leads to efficiency, by reducing internal uncertainty that burdens the transaction between banks and firms, and by promoting adaptability and flexibility when the environment is changing. [fre] Pour analyser les structures de gouvernement potentielles entre les banques et les entreprises, les auteurs étudient la pertinence du concept de quasi-intégration pour caractériser la relation banque-entreprise. Trois formes pures de gouvernement banque-entreprise sont ainsi mises en évidence : le marché, la quasi- intégration et la hiérarchie. Des éléments descriptifs empruntés aux modèles allemands et japonais permettent de caractériser ces structures de gouvernement. Si, dans une relation de marché, l'incitation à court terme constitue la forme de coordination principale, dans la relation hiérarchique, c'est l'autorité. Enfin, dans la relation de quasi- intégration, trois formes de coordination se combinent, l'autorité, l'incitation et la confiance. Compte tenu de cette pluralité, la quasi-intégration constitue une forme organisationnelle efficiente, notamment pour les PME confrontées à l'incertitude
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Allegret & Bernard Baudry, 1996. "La relation banque-entreprise : structures de gouvernement et formes de coordination," Post-Print hal-01660199, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01660199
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01660199
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Psillaki, 1998. "Une présentation critique des mécanismes de révélation appliqués au marché du crédit," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 13(2), pages 29-58.
    2. Carlos Arriaga & Luis Miranda, 2009. "Risk and Efficiency in Credit Concession: A Case Study in Portugal," Managing Global Transitions, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 7(3), pages 307-326.

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