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States as Game Players The Example of Russia, China and Europe

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  • Gérard Mondello

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

This article highlights the importance of the use of credible and non-credible threats. Its main lesson is that cooperation is even stronger when based on long-term relationships which makes failures implausible. It reasonably well describes the relationships that exist between the Russian Federation and China (players 1 and 3), player 2 for example being Europe. Obviously, one may object that the United States are missing from the picture. In fact, adding a fourth partner would not have changed the global framework of the game but would have add in complexity. All in all, international relationsships analysis can usefully be studied in terms of classical game theory. However, this approach needs adaptations of standard game theory. Indeed, t these games are sequential and they mainly accept pure strategies as solution of the game but not mixed strategies which are non sense in this context. However, mixed strategies can be conceived in the cases of armed conflict. To conclude, even if not developed, the spirit of GO game motivated our paper in which cooperation between two players does not exclude competition. Players 1 and 3 of our representation understood that they could not permanently exclude on each other from the international scene. Then, they preferred delineate areas that give them the highest possible benefits. In the simple model we gave, Player-2 bears the brunt of this agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Mondello, 2015. "States as Game Players The Example of Russia, China and Europe," Post-Print hal-01251732, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01251732
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01251732
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    Keywords

    Game theory; coalitions; geostrategy; threat-game;
    All these keywords.

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