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Nash stability in fractional hedonic games

Author

Listed:
  • Vittorio Bilò

    (Dipartimento di Matematica Ennio De Giorgi - Università del Salento)

  • Angelo Fanelli

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Michele Flammini

    (DISIM - Dipartimento di Ingegneria, Scienza dell'Informazione e Matematica - UNIVAQ - Università degli Studi dell'Aquila = University of L'Aquila, GSSI - Gran Sasso Science Institute)

  • Gianpiero Monaco

    (DISIM - Dipartimento di Ingegneria, Scienza dell'Informazione e Matematica - UNIVAQ - Università degli Studi dell'Aquila = University of L'Aquila)

  • Luca Moscardelli

    (Department of Economic Studies - University of Chieti-Pescara)

Abstract

Cluster formation games are games in which self-organized groups (or clusters) are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent and selfish players. We consider fractional hedonic games, that is, cluster formation games in which the happiness of each player in a group is the average value she ascribes to its members. We adopt Nash stable outcomes, where no player can improve her utility by unilaterally changing her own group, as the target solution concept and study their existence, complexity and performance for games played on general and specific graph topologies.

Suggested Citation

  • Vittorio Bilò & Angelo Fanelli & Michele Flammini & Gianpiero Monaco & Luca Moscardelli, 2014. "Nash stability in fractional hedonic games," Post-Print hal-01103984, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01103984
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_44
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    Cited by:

    1. Vittorio Bilò & Angelo Fanelli & Michele Flammini & Gianpiero Monaco & Luca Moscardelli, 2018. "Nash Stable Outcomes in Fractional Hedonic Games: Existence, Efficiency and Computation," Post-Print hal-02089363, HAL.
    2. Rothe, Jörg & Schadrack, Hilmar & Schend, Lena, 2018. "Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 21-36.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    hedonic games; Nash stability;

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