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Les auditeurs financiers face aux conflits d'agence : une étude des déterminants des honoraires d'audit en France

Author

Listed:
  • Cédric Lesage

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Chiraz Ben Ali

    (IPAG Business School)

Abstract

Considering the audit of financial statements as a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry, one can hypothesize that agency conflicts influence audit fees. Studying the audit fees paid by the SBF 250 listed firms, our results show : 1) the absence of a significant relationship between managerial ownership and audit fees ; 2) a curvilinear relation (inversed U shape) between controlling shareholders ownership and audit fees ; 3) a negative relation between family control and audit fees. These results outline the dominance of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in France, unlike in Anglo-Saxon countries where the dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders. The study permits to draw practical implications for practitioners and regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Cédric Lesage & Chiraz Ben Ali, 2013. "Les auditeurs financiers face aux conflits d'agence : une étude des déterminants des honoraires d'audit en France," Post-Print hal-00853061, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00853061
    DOI: 10.3917/cca.191.0059
    as

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Raúl Barroso & Chiraz Ben Ali & Cédric Lesage, 2018. "Blockholders’ Ownership and Audit Fees: The Impact of the Corporate Governance Model," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(1), pages 149-172, January.
    2. Chiraz Ben Ali & Frederic Teulon, 2014. "CEO Monitoring and board effectiveness: Resolving CEO compensation issue," Working Papers 2014-45, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    3. Ines Maraghni & Mehdi Nekhili, 2017. "Audit committee characteristics and audit fees: Evidence from France [Caractéristiques du comité d’audit et honoraires d’audit : cas des entreprises françaises]," Post-Print hal-01907594, HAL.
    4. Sophie Audousset-Coulier, 2015. "Audit Fees in a Joint Audit Setting," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(2), pages 347-377, June.

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