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Mesurer l'impact de l'effet partisan sur les réformes de corporate governance

Author

Listed:
  • Thibault Darcillon

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

Using a panel fixed effects logit model and a Cox conditional model in gap time, this paper provides new evidence on the linkages between the adoption of pro-shareholder reforms in corporate governance at the firm level and the government ideological affiliation in 16 OECD countries over 1970-2009. Among other results, we find strong evidence in favor of a positive effect of a right-wing government on the timing of adoption of minority shareholder protection legislation. In addition, we find no empirical evidence for the compensation hypothesis that argues that an increase in employment protection legislation would make easier the adoption of pro-shareholder measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Thibault Darcillon, 2013. "Mesurer l'impact de l'effet partisan sur les réformes de corporate governance," Post-Print hal-00824968, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00824968
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.643.0445
    as

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    Keywords

    political partisanship; institutional change; compensation hypothesis; Corporate Governance; effet partisan; changement institutionnel; hypothèse de compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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