IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00272887.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Continuous versus Discrete Market Games

Author

Listed:
  • Alexandre Marino

    (CERMSEM - CEntre de Recherche en Mathématiques, Statistique et Économie Mathématique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bernard de Meyer

    (CERMSEM - CEntre de Recherche en Mathématiques, Statistique et Économie Mathématique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

De Meyer and Moussa Saley [4] provide an endogenous justification for the appearance of Brownian Motion in Finance by modeling the strategic interaction between two asymmetrically informed market makers with a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information. The crucial point of this justification is the appearance of the normal distribution in the asymptotic behavior of Vn(P) pn . In De Meyer and Moussa Saley's model [4], agents can fix a price in a continuous space. In the real world however, the market compels the agents to post prices in a discrete set. The previous remark raises the following question: Does the normal density still appear in the asymptotic of Vn pn for the discrete market game? The main topic of this paper is to prove that for all discretization of the price set, Vn(P) pn converges uniformly to 0. Despite of this fact, we do not reject De Meyer, Moussa analysis: when the size of the discretization step is small as compared to n−12 , the continuous market game is a good approximation of the discrete one.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandre Marino & Bernard de Meyer, 2005. "Continuous versus Discrete Market Games," Post-Print hal-00272887, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00272887
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00272887. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.