J. Atsu Amegashie () (University of Guelph; Department of Economics)
Abstract
In a world where the private protection of property is costly, government redistribution can lead to an increase in aggregate output. I find that while redistribution increases aggregate output, it may make some members of the society worse off. The State may directly enhance economic rights through investments in security and the protection of property or it may indirectly do so through the redistribution of income. Indeed, under certain conditions, redistribution becomes desirable in situations where the State has exhausted its ability to enhance efficiency through the direct enforcement of property rights. In this case, redistribution can make all members of a society better off. Specifically, this occurs when the cost of predation is sufficiently low and the technology of private protection of property rights is sufficiently weak. The adverse effects of redistribution may be the consequence but not the cause of State failure. The real cause is a corrupt and inept State.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
0705.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
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