Liability Law and the Control of Externalities with Costly and Uncertain Litigation
AbstractIs liability law a suitable instrument for controlling externalities? The optimistic view from the law and economics literature conflicts with observed outcomes from jurisdictions relying on a tort-based procedure for controlling externalities. This discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that results from the highly simplified models used by earlier writers are not robust to modest improvements in the realism of the model structures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 1998-2.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
EXTERNALITIES ; LAW ; LIABILITY ; COSTS ; UNCERTAINTY;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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