Tort Law and The Efficient Control of Externalities with Multiple Defendants
AbstractIt has been widely argued that tort law can provide an effective decentralizes mechanism by which a socially optimal level of externality control can be achieved. I reconsider this argument in the very common situation in which there are multiple contributors to an incident of external damages, and the court assigns responsibility for damages based on each party's proportionate contribution to the externality. In this situation a strict liability law leads to short and long run efficiency only when the damage functioin is a straight line out of the origin.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 1998-1.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
EXTERNALITIES ; LAW ; LIABILITY;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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