Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game II: Deviations Based Refinements of N ash Equilibrium
AbstractIn any Nash equilibrium no player will unilaterally deviate. However, many games have multiple Nash equilibria. In this paper, we survey some refinements of Nash equilibria based on the hypothesis that any player may consider a deliberate deviation from a Nash equilibrium vector while expecting other players to respond optimally to this deviation. The concepts studied here differ in the expectations players have about other players' responses to a deviation. This sort of deviations philosophy is predicated on the thought process of players. Therefore, the validity of a particular equilibrium concept to an economic model may depend upon the relevance of the thought process implied by the concept. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 1992-10.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
economic equilibrium ; game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Sadanand, Asha B & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1995. "Equilibria in Non-cooperative Games II: Deviations Based Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 93-113, April.
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