Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Game I: Perturbations Based Refinements of Nash Equilibrium
AbstractThe concept of Nash equilibrium is widely used to analyze non-cooperative games. However, one of the problems with that concept is that many games have multiple equilibria. Recent work has concentrated on reducing or refining the set of Nash equilibria in some games. In this paper, we survey some equilibrium concepts based on perturbations of strategies that refine the set of Nash equilibria. We discuss the pros and cons of each concept and its relationship to the others by the use of numerous examples and intuition. It is hoped that this survey will enable the economist to consider the relevance of a particular equilibrium concept to a given economic model of interest. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 1992-09.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
economic equilibrium ; game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Sadanand, Asha B & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1994. "Equilibria in Non-cooperative Games I: Perturbations Based Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 197-224, July.
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