As-Efficient Competitor Test in Exclusionary Prices Strategies: Does Post-Danmark Really Pave the Way towards a More Economic Approach?
AbstractThe Post Danmark judgment may cast the light on the interpretations by the EU Court of Justice of crucial dimensions of the competition policy as: selective price cuts, above-cost rebates, costs test for exclusionary abuses with common costs. As we see one of the main interests of the decision lies on the cost criteria used by the Court to determine if a given price practice may exclude a competitor as efficient as the incumbent. In other words, does Post Danmark constitutes a real step towards the appropriation by the Court of Justice of the more economic approach promoted by the Commission and, more broadly, is really the logic of the Court coherent with an effects-based approach? Does Post Danmark conciliates the traditional decisional practice of the Court with the new principles of competition policy enforcement advocated by the Commission since the issuance of its February 2009 guidelines, relative to the exclusionary practices of dominant undertakings?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis in its series GREDEG Working Papers with number 2013-26.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision: Mar 2014
exclusionary practices; abuse of dominant position; predatory pricing; as-efficient competitor test;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-09-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HME-2013-09-13 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-LAW-2013-09-13 (Law & Economics)
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