Efficient inter-group competition and the provision of public goods
AbstractWe propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to solve the free-riding problem in the public goods game. Our solution only requires knowledge of the group contributions, is budget balanced and with the right parameters a dominant strategy. The main innovations of our design are that the prize to the winning group is paid by the losing group and that the size of the transfer depends on the difference in contribution by the two groups. With the right parameters, this scheme changes the dominant strategy from none to full contribution. We tested different parameterizations for the ICS. The experiments show dramatic gains in efficiency in all the ICS treatments. Moreover, versions of the ICS in which intergroup competition should not change the zero contribution Nash equilibrium also produce remarkable gains in efficiency and no decline in contributions over time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 10/03.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2010
Date of revision:
public goods; intergroup competition; team production; voluntary contributions mechanism; economic experiments;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-04-24 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-04-24 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-04-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2010-04-24 (Public Finance)
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