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Der „more economic approach“ in der Missbrauchsaufsicht: Einige kritische Anmerkungen zu den Vorschlägen der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb

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  • André Schmidt

    ()
    (University of Goettingen)

  • Stefan Voigt

Abstract

Im Rahmen der Verwirklichung des „more economic approach“ in der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik hat die Europäische Kommission im Dezember 2005 umfangreiche Vorschläge zur Neugestaltung der Missbrauchsaufsicht vorgestellt. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden diese Vorschläge in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt und diskutiert. Die Verfasser zeigen dabei unter anderem auf, dass die Realisierung der Vorschläge zu einer weiteren Stärkung einer rule of reason-Anwendung in der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik führen würde. Damit verzichtet die Kommission jedoch auf die ökonomische Vorteilhaftigkeit von per se-Regeln. Darüber hinaus setzen die Verfasser sich kritisch mit der von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen Berücksichtigung von Effizienzwirkungen im Rahmen der Missbrauchsaufsicht auseinander. The Commission’s proposals regarding the implementation of art. 82 TEC are shortly presented. The authors show that they can be interpreted as another step towards a “more economic approach” because their implementation would strengthen the rule of reason even further. The Commission’s proposal to introduce an efficiency defense is critically discussed as are some of the other means proposed to deal with various behavioral strategies such as pricing, rebates, bundling, and aftermarkets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Goettingen, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Discussion Papers with number 129.

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Length: 18
Date of creation: 19 Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:got:vwldps:129

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Keywords: Europäische Wettbewerbspolitik; Missbrauchsaufsicht; Marktbeherrschung; per se- Regeln vs. rule of reason;

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Cited by:
  1. Renate Ohr, 2009. "European Monetary Union at Ten: Had the German Maastricht Critics Been Wrong?," Departmental Discussion Papers 141, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  2. Corinna Ahlfeld, 2009. "The scapegoat of heterogeneity - How fragmentation influences political decisionmaking," Departmental Discussion Papers 143, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  3. Sascha Wolff, 2006. "Migration und ihre Determinanten im ost-westdeutschen Kontext nach der Wiedervereinigung: Ein Literaturüberblick," Departmental Discussion Papers 130, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

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