Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance
AbstractWe describe a plausible set of conditions under which the creation of a per-issue market for corporate cotes that is separate from the market for corporate shares can improve upon the way in which managerial adverse selection and moral hazard problems addresses via existing mechanisms for coroporate governance. Our results suggest that it may prove beneficial to reconsider the prohibitions against the operation of such markets as they currently exist in the US.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy in its series Papers with number 9904.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/
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BUSINESS FINANCING ; LAW ; TAKEOVERS;
Other versions of this item:
- Zvika NEEMAN & Gerhard O. OROSEL, 1999. "Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance," Vienna Economics Papers vie9904, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
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- Choi, Stephen J. & Talley, Eric L., 2001. "A Defense of Shareholder Favoritism," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1z97645j, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Hart, Oliver, 2001. "Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3073, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Susan E. K. Christoffersen & Christopher C. Geczy & David K. Musto & Adam V. Reed, 2004. "How and Why do Investors Trade Votes, and What Does it Mean?," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-23, CIRANO.
- Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, 2001. "Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 8633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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