Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information

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Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information

Author Info

Kerschbamer, R.
Maderner, N.

Abstract

This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter's concern for the environment.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy in its series Papers with number 9805.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:waslbp:9805

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Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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