Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information
AbstractThis paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter's concern for the environment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy in its series Papers with number 9805.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/
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POLLUTION ; INFORMATION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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