The "aftermarkets" literature focuses on two important questions: (1) Do durable goods manufacturers that control their aftermarkets have an incentive to charge afetrmarket prices that exceed costs? (2) How significant (in a welfare sense) is the resulting distortion? Unlike previous work, this paper addresses that latter question by explicitly modeling firmm behavior under various market structure conditions.
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Paper provided by U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division in its series Papers with number
97-4.
Length: 10 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:usjuat:97-4
Contact details of provider: Postal: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ANTITRUST DIVISION, JUDICIARY CENTER BUILDING 555 4TH ST. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20001 U.S.A.. Email: Web page: http://www.justice.gov/atr/ More information through EDIRC
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