A Posnerian Model of Entry into Regulated Markets
AbstractIn this paper we investigate why regulators may wish to open regulated markets to entry by unregulated firms. We adopt Posner's view of regulation as a taxation scheme, whereby regulators set high rates in some markets in order to subsidize other markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 45-96.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Tel-Aviv University, The Sackler Institute of Economic Studies, Ramat Aviv 69 978 Tel-Aviv, Israel
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/
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REGULATION ; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ; MONOPOLIES;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
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