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Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling

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  • Palmqvist, S.
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    Abstract

    This paper analyzes the use of announcements of objectives or intentions, announcements which are common in implementation of monetary policy. This paper assumes that a central bank can signal at its own discretion and shows that while central banks with high inflation targets never use announcements, central banks with low inflation targets occasionally, but not always, will choose to reveal their private information through an announcement.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 663.

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    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: 1999
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:663

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    Related research

    Keywords: MONETARY POLICY ; CENTRAL BANKS ; ECONOMIC POLICY;

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    Cited by:
    1. Tarkka, Juha & Mayes, David, 1999. "The Value of Publishing Official Central Bank Forecasts," Research Discussion Papers 22/1999, Bank of Finland.

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