Moral hazard and Risk Speading in Partnerships
AbstractPartnerships provide a classic of tradoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentive s depends upon risk preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. We use a unique dataset on medical group practice to investigate this tradoff.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by RAND - Reprint Series in its series Papers with number 96-09.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1996
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RISK; HEALTH INSURANCE;
Other versions of this item:
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
- I19 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Other
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
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