Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Games
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper in its series Papers with number 43.
Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, PRINCETON NEW-JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
games ; information ; microeconomics ; economics;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, . "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.