Moral Hazard In Worker'S Compensation Insurance
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper in its series Papers with number 31.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, PRINCETON NEW-JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
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compensation ; workers ; insurance;
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- Paul Lanoie & Sophie Tavenas, 1995. "Costs and Benefits of Preventing Workplace Accidents: The Case of Participatory Ergonomics," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-38, CIRANO.
- Fortin, B. & Lanoie, P., 1998.
"Effects of Workers' Compensation : A Survey,"
9816, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
- repec:fth:prinin:238 is not listed on IDEAS
- Denis Bolduc & Bernard Fortin & France Labrecque & Paul Lanoie, 1997. "Incentive Effects of Public Insurance Programs on the Occurence and the Composition of Workplace Injuries," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-24, CIRANO.
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