This paper analyses the role of non-pecuniary private benefits going to employees in an incomplete contract approach to the regulation of utilities.
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Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number
9809.
Length: Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9809
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