The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and Renegotiation (Revised: 2-96)
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research in its series Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers with number 1-93.
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- Gary Gorton & James Kahn, . "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and Renegotiation (Revised: 2-96)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 01-93, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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- Patrick Asea & S. Brook Blomberg, 1997.
UCLA Economics Working Papers
764, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Preece, Dianna & Mullineaux, Donald J., 1996. "Monitoring, loan renegotiability, and firm value: The role of lending syndicates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 577-593, April.
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