It is well known that all the experimental results concerning the Ultimatum game are at variance with its single subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. We use here Rabin's concepts of equity and fairness equilibrium to investigate these results and analyse the coordination problem of that game.
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Length: 12 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:parima:1997-5
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General