Equity, Fairness Equilibria and Coordination in the Ultimatum Game
AbstractIt is well known that all the experimental results concerning the Ultimatum game are at variance with its single subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. We use here Rabin's concepts of equity and fairness equilibrium to investigate these results and analyse the coordination problem of that game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers du Laboratoire de MicroÃ©conomie AppliquÃ©e with number 1997-5.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITE DE PARIS I-PANTHEON-SORBONNE, CENTRE NATIONALE DE RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE, LABORATOIRE DE MICROECONOMIE APPLIQUEE, 90 DE TOLBIAC 75634 PARIS CEDEX 13 FRANCE.
Phone: 33 1 55 43 42 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://team.univ-paris1.fr/
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EQUITY ; GAMES;
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