Competitive Strategic Market Games
AbstractWe present a fairly simple, feasible, price-quantity strategic market game for pure-exchange economies with finitely many agents, such that the set of pure Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of competitive equilibria. Our set-up encompasses incomplete, non-convex, non-transitive, and discontinuous preferences with externalities. We call such a market-game Nash-competitive.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications with number 98.08.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1998
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
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- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
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