Marital Division Of Labor With Risk Of Divorce: The Role Of Enforcement Of Contracts
AbstractIt is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice." Therefore, in the present model, divorc e has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for suc h "voice" enforcement is weakened. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the author finds that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time, even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 09-88.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1988
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labour ; risk ; marital status ; contracts ; marriage;
Other versions of this item:
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1989. "Marital Division of Labor with Risk of Divorce: The Role of "Voice" Enforcement of Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(1), pages 113-27, January.
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- Libertad González Luna & Berkay Özcan, 2008.
"The risk of divorce and household saving behavior,"
Economics Working Papers
1111, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ian Smith, 2003. "The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 201-226, 04.
- Fahn, Matthias, 2011. "Three Essays on Commitment and Information Problems," Munich Dissertations in Economics 13750, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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- Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 763-793.
- Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Departmental Working Papers 1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Roeder, Kerstin, 2012.
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- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Roeder, Kerstin, 2012. "United but (Un-)Equal: Human Capital, Probability of Divorce and the Marriage Contract," IZA Discussion Papers 7038, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Roeder, Kerstin, 2012. "United but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce and the marriage contract," IDEI Working Papers 755, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau & Kerstin Roeder, 2012. "United but (Un)Equal: Human Capital, Probability of Divorce and the Marriage Contract," CESifo Working Paper Series 4020, CESifo Group Munich.
- Helmut Rainer, 2003.
"Should We Write Prenuptial Contracts?,"
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572, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Lundberg, Shelly, 2005. "The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 1787, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Matthias Fahn & Ray Rees, 2011. "Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility and Divorce," CESifo Working Paper Series 3655, CESifo Group Munich.
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