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Marital Division Of Labor With Risk Of Divorce: The Role Of Enforcement Of Contracts

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Author Info

  • LOMMERUD, K.E.

Abstract

It is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice." Therefore, in the present model, divorc e has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for suc h "voice" enforcement is weakened. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the author finds that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time, even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 09-88.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:norgee:09-88

Contact details of provider:
Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Email:
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
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Related research

Keywords: labour ; risk ; marital status ; contracts ; marriage;

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Cited by:
  1. Alessandro Cigno, 2013. "Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4555, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Libertad González & Berkay Özcan, 2013. "The Risk of Divorce and Household Saving Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 404-434.
  3. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 763-793.
  4. Lundberg, Shelly, 2005. "The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 1787, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Fahn, Matthias, 2011. "Three Essays on Commitment and Information Problems," Munich Dissertations in Economics 13750, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Helmut Rainer, 2003. "Should We Write Prenuptial Contracts?," Economics Discussion Papers 572, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  7. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Roeder, Kerstin, 2012. "United but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce and the marriage contract," IDEI Working Papers 755, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  8. Ian Smith, 2003. "The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 201-226, 04.
  9. Matthias Fahn & Ray Rees, 2011. "Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility and Divorce," CESifo Working Paper Series 3655, CESifo Group Munich.

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