This paper extends the infinitely repeated tariff lobbying game of Pecorino [8] to allow for imperfect monitoring, and revisits the question of how an industry's ability to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by the number of firms in the industry. The paper demonstrated that Pecorino [8] finding that there is nothing in the underlying structure of payouts which guarantees that cooperation must breakdown as the number of grows large is not robust.
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Paper provided by New South Wales - School of Economics in its series Papers with number
99/3.
Length: 18 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:nesowa:99/3
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior