Firms regularly introduce new, non-patentable products and innovations. When the possibility of a new product or an innovation arises to a potential seller, the seller faces a risk in successfully creating and producing a new product that consumers value above its costs. This framework enables a new analysis of signaling and adverse selection in models of fixed, exogenous quality or types.
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Paper provided by Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory in its series Papers with number
9404.
Length: 23 pages Date of creation: 1994 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:mistet:9404
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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