Bribing and Stategic Delay a Theory of the Interactions Between Formal and Informal Rural Credit Markets
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research- in its series Papers with number 61.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1991
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- Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 1996. "Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 433-449, December.
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