The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society
AbstractSocial conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. it is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes correspondingly with changes in the population structure due to generation shifts. A scandal is defined as a breach of the accepted norm by prominent persons.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics in its series Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre with number 105.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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Postal: Institute of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, D-20146 Hamburg F.R.G
Phone: +49 (0)40 6541 2590
Fax: +49 (0)40 6541 2780
Web page: http://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/
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GAME THEORY ; SOCIAL CHOICE ; CONFLICTS ; SOCIETY ; CULTURE;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- J19 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Other
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
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