Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. it is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes correspondingly with changes in the population structure due to generation shifts. A scandal is defined as a breach of the accepted norm by prominent persons.
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Length: 18 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:hambec:105
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances J19 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Other Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General