Designing yous Investor's Adequate Incentives
AbstractThis paper studies the design of financial agreements (claims, tightness of relationships) between entrepreneurs and investors, in the case where both must exert costly unobservable efforts to improve the profitability of the firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 99.520.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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INVESTMENTS ; INCENTIVES ; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
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