This paper studies the design of financial agreements (claims, tightness of relationships) between entrepreneurs and investors, in the case where both must exert costly unobservable efforts to improve the profitability of the firm.
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Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number
99.520.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General